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NOTES
EXTENSION OF THE DRAM SHOP ACT:
NEW FOUND LIABILITY OF THE
SOCIAL HOST
INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently decided the case of
Ross v. Ross.1 The case presented to the court the question of
whether persons who are not in the business of selling intoxicating
liquor are liable under the civil damage act2 for furnishing liquor
to a minor, proximately causing his death. Defendant Delmar Ross
and Joel Owen Johnson purchased liquor for Delmar's minor broth-
er, Rodney Alan Ross, which resulted in Rodney's becoming intoxi-
cated. The jury found that Rodney's intoxication proximately caused
his death when the car he was driving left the road. The consoli-
dated actions were brought on behalf of Rodney's infant son and
by Rodney's parents.
On the facts presented by Ross, Justice Otis answered the
question in the affirmitive, concluding that the so-called "dram shop
act" or "civil damage act"8 manifests a legislative intent to im-
pose liability on any person who furnishes liquor illegally,4 includ-
ing those who are not in the business of selling liquor but merely
provide liquor gratuitously as an act of hospitality. Therefore, if
injury or damage occurs to a third person as a result of the in-
toxication of the recipient who was furnished the liquor illegally,
1. Ross v. Ross, - Minn.------, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
2. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972); Injuries caused by intoxication, ci4i actions.
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is Injured
in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or by the in-
toxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name, against any person
who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving Intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxica-
tion of such person, for all damages, sustained; and all damages recovered by a minor
under this section shall be paid either to such minor or to his parent, guardian, or next
friend, as the court directs; and all suits for damages under this section shall be by
civil action in any court of this state having jurisdiction thereof.
3. Id. Hereafter referred to as DRAM SHOP AcT. Although civil damage act is the
more contemporary title given such acts, the term "dram shop act" is the most com-
monly used.
4. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 340.12, 340.73, 340.79, 840.95 (1972). MINN. STAT. ANN. §
340.73(1) is the most pertinent of the statutes and provides: "It shall be unlawful for
any person, except a licensed pharmacist to sell, give, barter, furnish, deliver, or dispose
of, in any manner, either directly or indirectly, any spirituous, vinous, malt, or fermented
liquors in any quantity, for any purpose, whatever to any minor person, or to any in-
toxicated person, or to any public prostitute."
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any person who has furnished the liquor illegally is liable for the
resulting injury or damage.
With this decision, Minnesota became the second stater to ex-
tend the application of its "Dram Shop Act" to those people who
are not in the business of selling liquor but who merely provide
it gratuitously. Although the Ross case can obviously be considered
a minority approach, it is representative of a growing number of
cases 6 that seem to indicate a reversal of the common law rule'
which has insulated the vendor and social host from liability for
damage resulting from the illegal sale or gift of intoxicating liquor.
In exploring this topic, this note will focus on the historical devel-
opment of "dram shop acts," an analysis of the case law limiting
application of the "dram shop act" to vendors of liquor, an exami-
nation of the case law extending liability to the social host, the
practical difficulties with such an extension, and alternatives to the
imposition of strict liability upon the social host.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF "DRAM SHOP ACTS"
Numerous cases have held that at common law persons who
are injured by an intoxicated patron have no remedy against the
vendor of the liquor." It was not a crime to give intoxicating liq-
uor to an able bodied man and any able bodied man who drank
intoxicating liquor was responsible for any damage caused by his
5. Iowa is the other state which has recently interpreted its dram shop act in a
manner extending liability to social hosts. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa
1972).
6. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 903 (1960) ; Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Prevatt
v. McClennan, 201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) ; Colligan v. Cousar, 38 I1. App.
2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963) ; Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966);
Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498,
233 N.E.2d 18 (1968) ; Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) ; Berkeley v.
Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge
No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964) ; Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656,
393 S.W.2d 755 (1965).
Recent decisions, however, have not all favored the extension of liability. The con-
trary position Is also well-represented. Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656(1965) ; Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962) ; Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho
389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958); Lee
v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966) ; Hall v. Budagher Bar, 76 N.M.
591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
7. Cherbonnler v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alas. 1950); Collier v. Stamatis,
63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945) ; Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965) ;
Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329 ('1943) Meae v.
Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92
N.W.2d 682 (1958) ; Stringer v. Calmes, 167 Kan. 278, 205 P.2d 921 (1949) ; Lee v. Peer-
less Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966) ; Statae ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md.
249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951) ; Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 430, P.2d 358
(1969) Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis.
66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939). See generally 45 AM. Jus. 2d, Intoxicating liquor §§ 553, 554
(1969) 130 A.L.R. 352, 357; 75 A.L.R. 2d 833, 835, § 3.
8. Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831
(1965) ; Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967); Howlett v. Dogllo, 402
III. 311, 83 N.EI.2d 708 (1949) ; Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292
(1963) ; Elder v. Fisher, 247 Iad. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Cowman v. Hansen, 250
Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958) ; Le Gault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712
(1967); Mitchell v. Ketner, (Tenn. App, Ct. 1964) 393 S.W.2d 755.
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intoxication.9 The sale of the liquor to the patron was considered
too remote to be the proximate cause of any damage caused by
the intoxicated patron.'0 Those persons who suffered harm by rea-
son of the patrons intoxication could only recover from the individ-
ual drinker.
Although the National Temperance Movement did not effectuate
the 18th Amendment of the Constitution until 1919, prior to that
time prohibitionists lobbied state legislatures to pass "dram shop
acts" aimed at controlling liquor traffic and to provide against the
evils of intoxicating liquors.11 Early efforts at temperance reform
were aimed at the individual drinker.12 However, when these ef-
forts proved unsuccessful the prohibitionists turned to the state leg-
islatures in an effort to cut off the liquor supply.'2 The prohibition-
ists lobbied for legislation which would control the sale of liquor by
the various "grog shops" and "dram shops. ' 14 As a result of these
efforts statutes were passed imposing civil liability upon an inn-
keeper for damages caused by the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor.
One of the first dram shop acts imposing civil liability upon the
innkeeper for harm arising from his business was enacted in Wis-
consin in 1849.15 Under this statute the innkeeper was required to
post a bond out of which he was to ". . . support all paupers, wid-
ows and orphans and pay the expenses of all civil and criminal
prosecutions growing out of or justly attributing to such traffic."' 6
Probably the first statute passed which is representative of the dram
shop acts as they exist today was passed in Indiana in 1853.11
Through the passage of dram shop acts the legislatures sought to
protect the health, safety and welfare of the public by regulating
the distribution of liquor and providing remedies for injured parties
which did not exist at common law. 8 Although prohibition senti-
ment declined during the Civil War, it reached new peaks during
the 1870's during which most of the dram shop acts were adopted
and remained until prohibition. 19 Some of these statutes adopted
during the 1870's went virtually unchanged and remain in the stat-
utes of some states today.
20
9. Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831
(1965) ; Mitchell v. Ketner, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. App. Ct. 1964).
10. Mitchell v. Ketner, 393 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tenn. App. Ct. 1964).
11. Sharp, Dram Shop Laws and Problems, 28 Ala. Lawyer 409 (1967).
12. A.B.A. SECT. OF INS. NEG. & COMP. LAW, 448 (1967).
13. Id.
14. Id. The term "dram shop" described Inns where liquor could be sold In measured
quantities of less than a gallon.
15. Id. at 449.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 450.
19. Id. at 451.
20. Id. at 450.
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Today twenty states 21 have some form of dram shop act al-
though the remedy they afford and the class of people they protect
varies considerably between the states. Ten states have a rather
broad form of dram shop act which allows recovery for loss of
support and injuries to person or property when the damage is in-
flicted by reason of intoxication.2 2 Other states have statutes which
at best only vaguely resemble dram shop acts as they are generally
known due to their limited application. Six states have statutes
which apply only to the providing of liquor to a habitual drunkard
or minor after the innkeeper has received notice not to furnish liq-
uor to such a person. 3 However, even if the injured party can
21. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121 (1958) (wife, etc., shall have a right of action for
injury in consequence of sale or disposition of prohibited liquors or beverages); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1973) (liquor seller liable for damage by Intoxicated
person) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit 4, § 716 (1953) (civil liability for sale to forbidden in-
dividual) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (actions for damages
caused by Intoxication) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (1946) (civil action); ME. RxV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964) (responsibility for injuries by drunken persons) ; Mica.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (1967) (unlawful sale, right of action for damages, survival
of action; form of action; continuance of bond) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972)
(injuries caused by Intoxication, civil actions) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 202.070 (1968) (civil
liability of saloon keeper allowing minor to remain in establishment) ; N.Y. GEN.
OBLIGATIONS LAW § 11-101 (McKinney Supp. 1964) (compensation for injury caused by
illegal sale of intoxicating liquor) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-332 (1969) (selling or giving
Intoxicants to unmarried minors by dealers; liability for exemplary damages); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1971) (recovery of damages resulting from Intoxication);
Onio REv. CODE § 4399.01 (1964) (action against seller of liquor for Injury caused
intoxicated person to whom sale is prohibited); OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 121 (1951) (civil
liability for damages for causing intoxication); OR. REv. STAT. § 30-730 (1972) (li-
ability of person supplying liquor to intoxicated person or habitual drunkard); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-11-1 (1956) (liability of furnisher of beverages for injuries by
intoxicated persons) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972) (unlawful sale of intoxicating
liquor; civil action for damages) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 71.08.080 (1961)
(civil liability for furnishing intoxicants to habitual drunkard); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.35 (1957) (action for injury by unlawful sale) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-34 (1957)
(sale after notice to licensee or permittee).
22. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121 (1958), (wife, etc., shall have a right of action for In-
jury in consequence of sale or disposition of prohibited liquors or beverages) ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (actions for damages caused by in-
toxication); IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (1946) (civil action); Ms. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 2002 (1964) (responsibility for Injuries by drunken persons) ; MiCn. Comp. LAWS
§ 436.22 (1948) (unlawful sale, right of action for damages, survial of action; form
of action; continuance of bond); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972) (injuries caused
by Intoxication, civil actions); N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 11-101 (McKinney's Supp.
1964) (compensation for Injury caused by illegal sale of intoxicating liquor) ; N.D. CENT.
CoDE. § 5-0.1-06 (Supp. 1971) (recovery of damages resulting from intoxication) ; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 37, § 121 (1951) (civil liability for damages for causing intoxication) ; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1957) (unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor; civil action for
damages).
In addition to the ten states having a broad form of dram shop act, Connecticut
and Rhode Island provide a similar remedy restricted to damage to person or property.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1973) (liquor seller liable for damage by Intoxi-
cated person) ; R.I. GsN. LAWS ANN. § 3-11-1 (1956) (liability of furnisher of beverages
for injuries by intoxicated persons. Oregon provides a remedy for all damage caused by
an intoxicated person, recovery being limited to the spouse, parent or child of an Intoxi-
cated person. ORE. REv. STAT. § 30-730 (1972) (liability of person supplying liquor to
intoxicated person or habitual drunkard).
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1973) (liquor seller liable for damage
by intoxicated person) ; DsL. CooE ANN. tit. 4, § 716 (1953) (civil liability for sale to
forbidden Individual) ; OHIO R v. CODE § 4,399.01 (1964) (action against seller of liquor
for injury caused intoxicated person to whom sale is prohibited) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 3-11-1 (1956) (liability of furnisher of beverages for Injuries by Intoxicated persons);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176-35 (1957) (action for injury by unlawful sale) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 12.34 (1957) (sale after notice to licensee or permittee).
In Washington, the statute not only is limited to the furnishing of liquor to a
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qualify under one of the dram shop acts several states impose an
arbitrary dollar limitation on the amount that can be recovered
under the act.24 Finally, some acts impose a further limitation on
their applicability by imposing a short statute of limitations.
2 5
Typical dram shop acts provide for recovery against one who
furnishes intoxicating liquor for injury or damage caused "by an
intoxicated person" or "in consequence of" or "by reason of" or
"on account of" the intoxication of any person. The significance of
the distinction is that with respect to injuries inflicted "by an in-
toxicated person," the courts have generally held that it is not
necessary that the intoxication be the proximate cause of the in-
jury.26 On the other hand, where the action is brought under a
statutory provision relating to injuries inflicted "in consequence of"
a person's intoxication, some courts hold that there can be no re-
covery unless the intoxication was the proximate, or at least a
contributing cause of the injury.2 7
Litigation under the dram shop acts outside the states with rel-
atively broad statutes is rare. The trend since the end of national
prohibition has been to repeal such statutes and no state has adopt-
ed such an act since 1935.28
habitual drunkard, but a habitual drunkard is defined as a person Judically declared
to be such after three convictions of being drunk in public. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, §§ 71.08.080, 71.08.020 (1961). In Nevada and North Carolina, the only statutary
liability imposed upon the innkeeper is to the parents of minors to whom liquor is
provided. Nzv. REv. STAT. § 202.070 (1968) (civil liability of saloon keeper allowing
minor to remain in establishment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-332 (1969) (selling or giving
intoxicant to unmarried minors by dealers; liability for exemplary damages).
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1973) (liquor seller liable for damage
by intoxicated person; $20,000 limitation for injuries to each person, $50,000 limitation
of aggregate amount to all persons injured); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 716 (1953) (civil
liability for sale to forbidden individual; $500 limitation for all types of recovery);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (actions for damages caused by
intoxication; $15,000 limit for injuries to persons or property and $20,000 for loss of
support).
25. CONN. GUN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1973) (liquor seller liable for damage
by intoxicated person, one year) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972)
(actions for damages caused by intoxication-one year).
26. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (actions for damages
caused by intoxication); IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (1946) (civil action); MrNN. STAT.
ANN. § 340.95 (1972) (injuries caused by intoxication, civil actions). See Cox v. Hrasky,
318 nl. App. 287, 47 N.E.2d 728 (1943); Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa 172, 111 N.W.
422 (1907) ; Sworski v. Coleman, 208 Minn. 43, 293 N.W. 297 (1940).
27. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (actions for damages
caused by intoxication) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (1946) (civil action) ; MR. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1946) (responsibility for injuries by drunken persons) ; MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (1967) (unlawful sale, right of action for damages survival
of action, form of action, continuance of bond) ; N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONs LAW § 11-101
(McKinney Supp. 1964) (compensation for injury caused by Illegal sale of intoxicating
liquor) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-11-1 (1956) (liability of furnisher of beverages for
injuries by intoxicated persons) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972) (unlawful sale of
Intoxicating liquors; civil action for damages).
See Lichter v. Scher, 11 Ill. App. 2d 441, 452, 138 N.E.2d 66, 71 (1956) ; Earp v.
Lilly, 217 Ill. 582, 75 N.E. 552 (1905).
One State court has even held that Its Dram Shop Act dispenses with proof of any
causation or contribution to intoxication. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606
(1957).
28. A.B.A. SECT. OF INS., NEG. & COMP. LAW, 451 (1967).
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE
"DRAM SHOP ACT"-THE MAJORITY RULE
Although dram shop acts usually provide for the recovery of
damages from any person giving or selling intoxicating liquor, those
courts which have interpreted statutes containing the term "any
person" have uniformly held that dram shop acts were not intend-
ed to create a right of action against one who provides liquor gra-
tuitously, out of an act of hospitality and without pecuniary gain.2 9
Until the recently decided Minnesota and Iowa decisions it was uni-
formly held that dram shop acts provided a right of action only
against those individuals who were in the business of selling liquor
or engaged in liquor traffic.3 0
From a reading of the cases which support the general rule,
it would appear that the rationale behind limiting the application
of the dram shop act to those who are in the business of selling
liquor is based on either one or all of the following: (1) A strict
interpretation of the act finding that its primary purpose is to sup-
press the mischief rather than to extend the remedy; (2) Reliance
upon the historical environment out of which the act developed;
(3) Deference to the legislature to extend the remedy for fear of
opening the "floodgates" to litigation.
In Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,31 the plaintiffs were in-
jured by an automobile driven by an employee of the defendant
glass company, who allegedly became intoxicated from liquor serv-
ed at a company picnic. The plaintiffs sought recovery under the
Illinois Dram Shop Act 32 naming as defendants the employer, the
employee association and certain members of the association
who served the liquor at the picnic. The plaintiffs asserted that the
defendants were liable under the Illinois Dram Shop Act due to
their conduct in furnishing intoxicating liquor to an employee caus-
ing his intoxication. The trial court awarded summary judgment to
the defendants based on affifdavits indicating that they were not en-
gaged in the liquor business. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that
under the terms of the Dram Shop Act the dispensing of the liquor
need not necessarily be by one engaged in the liquor business. The
Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision holding
that:
29. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964)
Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219,
175 N.W.2d 303 (1970); LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (1967).
30. Id.
31. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 4.12, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964).
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (actions for damages
caused by intoxication).
NoTEs
This court does not believe that the legislature ever
intended to enact a law that makes social drinking of intox-
icating liquors and the giving of drinks of intoxicating liq-
uors to another, such conduct as to render the giver or
social host liable under the Dram Shop Act. If such was
the law, a social drink with your neighbor or friend would
become a hazardous act. It would open up the floodgates
of litigation as to almost every happening where someone
was injured.3 3
The court noted that the Dram Shop Act was remedial in purpose
but penal in nature, and chose to apply the act in such a manner
that would mitigate the evils and dangers which flow from the liq-
uor business by limiting the application of the Dram Shop Act to
those who are engaged therein. The court concluded that the legis-
lature did not intend under the act to create a law that makes
social drinking or the giving of intoxicating liquor to another con-
duct which renders the giver or social host liable under the Dram
Shop Act. Although the language of the Act clearly stated that lia-
bility applies to the "giving" of liquor as well as the sale, the court
interpreted the term "giving" as used in the Act to apply only to
one who is engaged in the liquor business, which, in the instant
case, the defendants were not.
In the often cited case of Cruse v. Aden,3 4 the court noted that
the very title of the act indicated that its provisions were aimed
at the dram shops and various other establishments which were
engaged in the liquor business. The only specific reference to the
"giving away" of liquor was made in conjunction with a section of
the act referring only to those who were engaged in the liquor
business and therefore was significantly restrictive. The court con-
cluded that:
The dram shop act does not apply to persons who are
not either directly, or indirectly . . .engaged in the liquor
traffic, . . the right of action given by said section to one
injured in her means of support is not intended to be giv-
en against a person who, in his own house or elsewhere,
gives a glass of intoxicating liquor to a friend as a mere
act of courtesy and politeness, and without any purpose or
expectation of pecuniary gain or profit.1
5
In LeGault v. Klebba,3 6 the Court of Appeals of Michigan held
that sponsors of a private wedding reception were not liable on a
33. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1964).
34. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
35. Id. at 77.
36. LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (1967).
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theory of common law negligence for injuries caused by a guest
who became intoxicated at the reception and who was subse-
quently involved in a serious automobile accident. The court stated
that recovery for such injury caused by an intoxicated person is
exclusively statutory; and though remedial, the statute must be
strictly construed. The court noted that other jurisdictions had
given a more liberal interpretation to dram shop acts as applied
to commercial vendors "in order to follow the spirit of the law"
and had gone so far as to apply common law negligence
against commercial vendors. However, the court could not find any
precedent holding private individuals liable. The court concluded
that "it is not the law that private individuals are liable for the
actions of their social guests who over-indulge in the liquid hospi-
tality provided at private homes or parties. '8 7
Although these cases may be considered representative of the
majority rule it is to be noted that most of the cases dealing with
the question of whether dram shop acts apply to social hosts have
arisen in Illinois. Until other states are presented with the same
question it may be a slight misnomer to label the "Illinois approach"
the majority rule. 8
EXTENDING LIABILITY TO THE SOCIAL HOST
In spite of substantial precedent to the contrary in other juris-
dictions, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the state
legislature did not intend to limit the application of its Civil Dam-
age Act 39 to only those individuals in the business of selling intoxi-
cating liquor.40 In making that determination, the court looked to
other Minnesota statutes existing at the time of the adoption of the
original Civil Damage Act in 1911, focusing in particular on those
statutes which made it illegal for "any person" to sell or give liq-
uor to a minor or intoxicated person.4 1 The court noted that the
original Civil Damage Act was entitled:
An act giving a right of action to certain persons, for in-juries caused by any intoxicated person, or by the intoxica-
tion of any person, against any person causing the same
in certain cases.4 2
37. Id. at 713.
38. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972). The Iowa Supreme Court
rejected defendant's assertion of the "general rule" noting that most of the cases came
from Illinois which interprets its dram shop act as penal in nature and is therefore
strictly construed.
39. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972) (injuries caused by intoxication, civil actions).
40. Rloss v. Ross, - Min. __, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
41. Id. at 150-51.
42. Id. at 151.
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This Civil Damage Act was found to be a separate statute without
any reference to prior provisions of the laws regulating the sale of
liquor. The court reasoned that had it been the intent of the legis-
lature to confine its application to liquor vendors, it would have
been included as an amendment to the statute requiring a bond
for licensed liquor vendors. Furthermore, the court noted that in
1911 automobiles were a relatively new device and the problem of
drinking and driving was not the "devastating menace" it is today.
This fact, the court reasoned, would seem to suggest that the leg-
islature "envisioned only limited application of the Civil Damage
Act to householders and social drinkers. . . [which] is not a rea-
son for our misapplying legislative intent 60 years later. ' '4 3 Two
previous holdings indicated that the Civil Damage Act was not lim-
ited to those in the liquor business. In 1882 the term "any person"
was construed in a way which did not restrict prosecutions for liq-
uor violaltions to those in business of selling intoxicating liquor.
Another holding indicated that the Civil Damage Act was both penal
and remedial in nature, an inconsistancy which the court resolved in
favor of a liberal interpretation "to suppress the mischief and ad-
vance the remedy."4 4 Finally, the court reasoned that since the Act
applies only to illegal sales it is not unreasonable to assume that
the legislature intended to include people who were not in the
business of selling intoxicating liquor.
"Where liquor is furnished in a purely social setting, ordin-
arily it may be expected that the donor will take some pre-
cautions to determine the age of the recipient or his state
of intoxication. While the act applies to those invited to
wedding receiptions and company picnics as well as to
other gatherings where supervision may be onerous, no rea-
son occures to us why those who furnish liquor to others,
even on social occassions, should not be responsible for pro-
tecting innocent third persons from the potential dangers of
indiscriminately furnishing such hospitality.4 5
Minnesota was not the first state to extend the application of
its dram shop act to those not in the business of selling intoxicat-
ing liquors. In Williams v. Klemsrud,46 the Iowa Supreme Court,
presented with facts very similar to those in Ross, held that its
dram shop act47 was intended to provide a right of action against
a defendant not engaged in liquor traffic. On September30, 1967,
the 21 year old defendant was attending college at Mason City, Iowa.
43. Id. at 151.
44. Id. at 152.
45. Id. at 158.
46. sliams v. Kiemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
47. Iowa CODE ANN. § 129.2 (1954) (civil action).
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His friend, Robert John Neis, age 20, provided money and solicited
defendant to purchase a pint of vodka for him at the state liquor
store, which he did. Neis consumed the liguor and became intoxi-
cated and subsequently, while driving an automobile, was involved
in a collision causing plaintiff's injuries and damages. Section 129.2
of the Iowa Code 48 provided that:
Every . . .person who shall be injured in person or prop-
erty. . . by any intoxicated person . . . shall have a right
of action . . . against any person who shall, by selling or
giving to another contrary to the provisions of this title
any intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of such per-
son, for all damages actually sustained, as well as exem-
plary damages.4 9
The court found that the defendant had violated I.C.A. § 123.43, 50
in providing liquor to a person under age 21, and therefore came
within the scope of "any person" intended by I.C.A. § 129.2.51 The
defendant asserted the general rule restricting the term "any per-
son" to those engaged in liquor traffic or sales, thereby excluding
the defendant. In support of his contention, defendant cited Miller
v. Owen-Illinois Glass Co., 52 and its accompanying annotation. 58 The
Iowa court noted, however, that most of the decisions from which
the writer of the cited annotation distilled the "general rule" were
cases from the state of Illinois which interprets its dram shop stat-
ute as penal in character and accordingly construes the statute
strictly. Iowa, on the other hand, has held its statute to be remed-
ial or compensatory and has rejected rules of strict construction
which would limit the scope of the act and thereby impair the
remedy. In light of this construction, the court declined to restrict
its holding to those persons engaged in the liquor business.
Oregon5 4 and California 55 were also recently confronted with
the issue of whether those not engaged in the liquor business may
be liable to third persons injured or damaged due to the negligence
of the social host in providing liquor to one who becomes intoxi-
cated and causes the harm. Although neither state had an appli-
cable dram shop act, 56 liability was extended to the social host
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. IowA CODE ANN. § 123.43 (1954). This is currently found in IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 123.47.
51. IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (1954) (civil action), § 123.47 (Supp. 1972).
52. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 4,8 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964).
53. 8 A.L.R. 3d 1412 (1966).
54. Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18
(Ore. 1971).
55. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 CaL Rptr. 752 (1972).
56. California does not have a dram shop act. Oregon's dram shop act is of limited
applicability. ORE. REV. STAT. § 30-.730 (1972) (liability of person supplying liquor to
intoxicated person or habitual drunkard).
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based upon reasoning similar to that of the Minnesota and Iowa
decisions.
In Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 57 the California Court
of Appeals held that any person, whether he is in the business of
dispensing alcoholic beverages or not, who disregards the legisla-
tive mandate that alcoholic beverage not be furnished to a minor,
breaches a duty to anyone who is injured as a result of the minor's
intoxication. The defendant, Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., held a Christ-
mas party at which a minor employee was served intoxicating liq-
uor thereby causing his intoxication. The employer placed the minor
in his automobile and directed him to drive the vehicle through
traffic to his home. While the minor was driving home he struck
the plaintiffs causing them to suffer personal injuries for which
they sought to recover damages against the employer. In holding
for the plaintiffs, the court stated that its decision was based pri-
marily on the fact that the employer guided the incompetent minor
to his automobile, placed him in his car, and directed him to drive
home through city traffic. The court also quoted extensively from
California Supreme Court's decision of Vesely v. Sager.5 In that
case the California Supreme Court declared that the real question
to be decided in cases involving illegal sales was not one of prob-
able cause, but rather whether the defendant was guilty of a breach
of duty to the injured party. The court went on to say that the
Vesely59 decision charts the course to be followed in California:
The impeccable logic of Vesely impels the conclusion
that any person, whether he is in the business of dispens-
ing alcoholic beverages or not, who disregards the legisla-
tive mandate breaches a duty to anyone who is injured as
a result of the minor's intoxication and for whose benefit
the statute was enacted. If one willfully disobeys the law
and knowingly furnishes liquor to a minor with knowledge
that the minor is going to drive a vehicle on the public
highways . . .he must face the consequences. The law, as
well as good sense, can demand no less.6'
Perhaps the most far reaching decision involving the extension
of liability to the social host was reached in Wiener v. Gamma Phi
Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity.2 In that case the Oregon
57. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752
(1972).
58. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). See 48
N.D. L. Rxv. 505 (1972).
59. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
60. Id.
61. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyol Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 755,
756 (1972).
62, Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Ore.
1971).
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Supreme Court held that a fraternity which gave a party where
alcoholic beverages were sold ought to have known that the guest
was a minor and that he would be driving after the party. The
serving of the alcohol to the guest was therefore, unreasonable, and
liability was imposed on the fraternity for damages or injuries re-
sulting from its unreasonable conduct in serving the liquor. Al-
though Oregon has a dram shop act, it is of very limited application
and was not available to the plaintiffs under the facts presented. 63
Defendant could also have been found to be liable under ORS 471.410
(2)64 which states: "No person other than his parent or guardian
shall give or otherwise make available any alcoholic liquor to a
person under the age of 21 years." 65 However, the court found that
".. . it was not the purpose of the statute to protect third persons
from injury resulting from the conduct of inebriated minors or of
imposing liability upon a person contributing to the minor's delin-
quency by furnishing him with alclohol. ' 66 Finding both of the
above statutes inapplicable to the facts presented, the court con-
cerned itself with the question of whether a host has the duty to
refuse to serve his guests further alcohol under certain circum-
stances. In other words, the court had to decide whether or not a
cause of action existed under ordinary principles of negligence and
proximate cause. The court recognized that ordinarily a host
who makes available intoxicating liquors to an adult guest is not
liable for injuries to third persons resulting from the guest's
intoxication. However, the court qualified this by stating that
there might be circumstances in which the host would have a duty
to deny his guest further access to alcohol. This would be the
case where the host "has reason to know that he is dealing with
persons whose characteristics make it especially likely that they
will do unreasonable things. ' 6 7 Such persons would include those
already severly intoxicated, or those whose behavior the host knows
to be unusually affected by alcohol. The court determined that each
case must be decided on its own facts and flatly rejected defend-
63. ORE. REV. STAT. § 80.730 (1972) (recovery is limited to the spouse, parent or
child of an intoxicated person).
64. OR. REv. STAT. § 471.410 (2) (1972).
65. 1d.
66. Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18,
21 (Ore. 1971). However other courts have held, through the Doctrine of Negligence per
&e, that particular legislation can create both a duty and standard which constitutes the
proper conduct of a reasonable man. This occurs when a court determines that certain
legislation is designed to protect a certain class of persons against a type of harm
which has in fact occurred as a result of violation of the statute. Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 862 U.S. 903 (1960);
Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 848 (D. Mont. 1969); Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155
So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1963) ; Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966) ; Rappaport
v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
67. Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18, 21
(Ore. 1971). See also W. PRossEa, THE LAw OF TORTS § 38 at 175 (3d. ed 1964).
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ant's contention that the furnishing of alcohol to others in a social
setting, even if the host acts unreasonably, can never give arise
to liability for acts of the intoxicated guest. In light of this reason-
ing, the court determined that the status of the fraternity as host
and its direct involvement in serving the liquor to the minor was
sufficient to raise the duty to refuse to serve alcohol to a guest
when it would be unreasonable under the circumstances to permit
him to drink. The allegations that the plaintiff was a minor and
that the fraternity ought to have known that he would be driving
after the party gave rise to circumstances from which a jury
might conclude that the fraternity's behavior was in fact unreason.
able.
As can be seen from the Minnesota, Iowa, California and Ore-
gon decisions, the liability of the social host is determined by a
finding that a duty exists to exercise reasonable prudence and judg-
ment in selling or giving liquor to others. This idea was appropri-
ately expressed in Garcia v. Hargrove,6 wherein the court stated:
We are still our brothers keepers, and it would be a
rare host at a social gathering who would knowingly give
more liquor to an 'intoxicated friend when he knows his in-
vitee must take care of himself on the highway and will
potentially endanger other persons. Social justice and com-
mon sense require the social host to see within reason that
his guests do not take too much generosity.69
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES
WITH THE DRAM SHOP EXTENSION
The thrust of all four decisions extending liability to the social
host is directed toward advancement of the remedy for those in-
dividuals who are injured or damaged by reason of the sale or
gift of intoxicating liquor and the subsequent intoxication of the tort
feasor. Yet, the burden on the social host or providor of the liquor
is substantially different under the Minnesota and Iowa decisions
based upon dram shop acts, than under the California and Oregon
decisions which found liability in the absence of a dram shop act.
The Minnesota and Iowa decisions by virtue of their dram shop
acts, impose the same strict liability on the social host as they do
upon the vendor. In these states, anyone who sells or gives an al-
coholic beverage to a minor or an intoxicated person, causing his
intoxication is strictly liable for all damages proximately caused by
the intoxication. It is no defense to the seller or social host that
68. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970). In a case where
the majority refused to Impose liability on those furnishing liquor on a social occasion,
Chief Justice Hallows dissented.
69. Id. at 573-74.
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he exercised every reasonable precaution to avoid giving or selling
the liquor illegally. This approach is inconsistent with the historical
rationale of the dram shop acts which, theoretically, was to shift
the cost of damage or injury to the vendor who was considered to
have a greater capacity to absorb the cost. Though the vendor
might be required to post bond or carry insurance for any damage
resulting from illegal sales of liquor, the cost of furnishing the se-
curity can be passed on to his customers in the form of higher
prices.70 The social host, on the other hand, receives no pecuniary
gain for providing alcoholic beverage to his guests and will have
to personally absorb the cost of any available insurance or other
security.
Another problem arises at very large social gatherings such as
wedding receptions and picnics. At such gatherings the social host
will be unable to confront every guest who desires an alcoholic
beverage to determine his state of intoxication or age. The liquor
vendor, on the other hand, necessarily has to confront every patron
whenever a sale is made thereby affording the vendor an opportu-
nity to observe the age and intoxication of the purchaser. However,
even if the social host was able to confront every guest when he
served a drink, it would be virtually impossible in many instances
to determine if the guest is too intoxicated to drive an automobile.
In many states, the requisite amount of blood alcohol content which
renders a driver intoxicated under the law has been reduced to
very low levels.7 1 Thus, in many instances an individual may be
intoxicated to the point at which he can no longer operate an au-
tomobile safely under the law and yet be able to conduct himself
in what appears to be a rational and normal manner.
Furthermore, a social host will not be able to protect himself
by limiting the number of drinks served, because under most dram
shop acts he may be held liable for merely contributing to the in-
toxication of an intoxicated guest who subsequently causes injury
or damage to a third person.7 2 A closely related situation is that
70. Comment, Dram Shop Liability - A Judicial Response, 57 CALn. L, REV. 995, 1017.
(1969).
71. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.121 (Supp. 1973). "It shall be a misdemeanor for any of
the following persons to drive, operate or be in actual physical control of any vehicle
within this state: . . . (d) A person whose blood contains 0.10 percent or more by weight
of alcohol." Id.
72. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (actions for damages caused
by intoxication); IowA Co D ANN. § 129.2 (1946) (civil action); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 2002 (1964) (responsibility for Injuries by drunken persons); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 436.22 (1948) (unlawful sale, right of action for damages survival of action,
form of action, continuance of bond); N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAw § 11-101 (McIinney
Supp. 1964) (compensation for injury caused by illegal sale of intoxicating liquor);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 3-11-1 (1956) (liability of furnisher of beverages for injuries
by Intoxicated persons); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (unlawful sale of intoxicating
liquors; civil action for damages).
See Lichter v. Scher, 11 IlL App. 2d 441, 452, 138 N.E.2d 66, 71 (1956) ; Earp v.
Lilly, 217 Ill. 582, 75 N.E. 552 (1905).
NOTES 81
of a person buying a friend a drink at a restaurant or bar. It
would seem that where the individual purchases the drink for another
he could be held liable under many dram shop acts as representing
"any person" who gives liquor to a minor or intoxicated person.73
The vendor of the liquor would not seem to come within the act
as he did not sell the liquor to the guest of the individual but only
to the individual.
Finally, it would seem that the imposition of strict liability upon
the social host is an unjustifiable burden in view of society's almost
total acceptance of the consumption of alcoholic beverages as a
basic part of social entertainment and expression of hospitality.
The only way in which a social host can assure himself that
he will not be liable under the dram shop act is to either refuse
to serve alcoholic beverages to his guests, which runs counter to
one of society's most well established norms, or absorb the cost of
insurance. This alternative does not appear to be a very attractive
one.
7 4
IN SEARCH OF A DESIRABLE STANDARD-
STRICT LIABILITY VS. REASONABLENESS
Drinking and driving has become one of the greatest and most
urgent problems facing the United States.75 The consumption of al-
73. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121 (1958) (wife, etc., shall have a right of action for in-jury in consequence of sale or disposition of prohibited liquors or beverages); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (actions for damages caused by intoxication) ;
IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (1946) (civil action) ; ME. R1v. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2002
(1964) (responsibility for injuries by drunken persons) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
436.22 (1967) (unlawful sale, right of action for damages, survival of action, form of
action, continuance of bond); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972) (injuries caused by
intoxication, civil actions) ; N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 11-101 (McKinney Supp. 1964)
(compensation for injury caused by illegal sale of intoxicating liquor); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 5-01-06 (Supp. 1971) (recovery of damages resulting from intoxication); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 37, § 121 (1951) (civil liability for damages for causing intoxication); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972) (unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor; civil action for damages).
74. The insurance agent for Travelers Insurance Company in Grand Forks, North
Dakota indicated that the basic home owners or renters insurance policy provides
coverage for personal liability up to $25,000 for both on and off the premises. This
coverage can be increased to $50,000 for an additional $2 per year; to $100,000 for $3;
to $200,000 for $5; and to $300,000 for $7. Interview with John C. Boe, Insurance Agent,
Travelers Insurance Co., Grand Forks, North Dakota, in Grand Forks, October 27, 1972.
The insurance agent for Farmers Insurance Group in Grand Forks, North Dakota,
Indicated that in addition to rates similar to those mentioned above, his company could
increase coverage up to $1,000,000 for an additional $55 per year. Interview with George
E. Wogaman, Insurance Agent, Farmers Insurance Group, Grand Forks, North Dakota,
In Grand Forks, October 27, 1972. Although these agents are located in Grand Forks,
North Dakota, Grand Forks borders Minnesota and these agents sell a considerable amount
of Insurance in Minnesota. The rates that they quoted are applicable to Minnesota.
It would appear that the cost of increasing coverage in Minnesota Is quite reason-
able. However, it is still questionable whether many people in Minnesota are aware
either of the need for this extended coverage or the available rates. In any event, strict
liability should be imposed only on those individuals who derive some pecuniary benefit
for providing liquor and not the social host. No matter what the cost of insurance
is, It seems unreasonable when applied to the social host.
75. Recent studies indicate that highway accidents in the United States now cause
an annual toll of more than 50,000 lives, more than 2,000,000 disabling personal in-juries and a staggering economic cost of $8 to $10 billion each year. Cramton, The
Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A.J. 995 (1968).
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coholic beverages and its use at social gatherings is almost totally
accepted. Coupled with the fact that the automobile has become the
most significant mode of transportation, the solution to the problem
becomes a difficult one. 76 Any solution to the problem will neces-
sarily involve a balancing of society's desire to drink and drive
and its desire to eliminate the damage caused thereby and provide
remedies for the victims of drunk drivers.
The Minnesota and Iowa decisions imposing strict liability upon
the social host for damage resulting from the illegal sale of alco-
holic beverages do not seem to strike a proper balance between
society's competing desires. The imposition of strict liability does
not allow the social host to protect himself from liability by acting
reasonably and in accord with society's norms. The California and
Oregon decisions, on the other hand, seem to present a viable al-
ternative.
In these two cases a duty was found to exist on the part of
the social host to exercise reasonable judgment in serving intoxi-
cating liquor to his guests so that they do not become intoxicated
and cause damage to third persons. In other words, a social host
will not be liable for any damage caused by an intoxicated guest
unless his conduct in serving the alcoholic beverage is negligent.
Whether or not a social host's conduct will be deemed negligent
or unreasonable will be for the jury to decide based upon the
particular circumstances of each case.
It is suggested that the following factors be taken into consid-
eration by a jury in determining whether or not a social host's con-
duct in serving intoxicating liquor is unreasonable: (1) Whether the
social host knows or ought to know that the guest he is serving
is a minor. This may depend upon the appearance, dress, conduct
and age of the guest and his associates; (2) Whether the host knew
or should have known that the guest was intoxicated when he serv-
ed him the alcoholic beverage. Factors to be considered would be
the physical appearance and conduct of the guest and knowledge
of the number of drinks that the guest has already consumed; (3)
Whether the host knows the guest's capacity to consume intoxicat-
ing liquor and how he reacts to the consumption; (4) Whether the
host knows or should know that the guest will be driving an auto-
mobile home from the social gathering; (5) What precautions the
host has taken at large social gatherings to control the dispurse-
ment of beverages.
In light of society's almost total acceptance and expectation of
76. Over 95,000,000 Americans are operating motor vehicles on the public highways
and some 70,000,000 Americans are consuming alcoholic beverages on a regular basis.
Cramton, The Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A.J. 995 (1968).
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alcoholic beverages at social gatherings, the requirement of rea-
sonable conduct on the part of the social host in serving liquor
would be a much more desirable and justifiable burden on the
social host than that of strict liability.
CONCLUSION
Dram shop acts arose out of the efforts of prohibitionists to
control the liquor traffic and provide remedies for harm caused by
that traffic. The prohibitionists reasoned that as long as the liquor
vendor was allowed to realize the fruits of his business he should
also bear the responsibility of any damage arising therefrom. Min-
nesota and Iowa have now chosen to extend the application of the
dram shop act to the social host. This extension has imposed an
unjustifiable burden on the social host as he is strictly liable for
any harm caused by an intoxicated guest. Unlike the vendor, the
social host receives no pecuniary benefit from occasionally serving
alcoholic beverages to friends and guests. The social host is now
subject to liability for conduct which society has accepted and de-
manded over the ages. It is true that the damage and injury caused
by intoxicated drivers is a very serious problem which society ab-
hors. However, the imposition of strict liability upon the social host
is not a reasonable solution to a problem created by society as a
whole. The extension of liability to the social host is reasonable
only to the extent that the social host is required to exercise rea-
sonable and prudent conduct in serving alcoholic beverages to his
guests.
D. SCOTT BALLOU

